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I. INTRODUCTION
Health care fraud takes on a variety of forms-from billing
insurance companies for services not provided, to falsifying injuries
for tort plaintiffs, to practicing medicine without a license.' All these
types of fraud contribute to the astronomical cost of health care in the
United States.2  As federal policymakers have focused on ways to
contain these costs,3 health care fraud has become an increasing
object of scrutiny.4  At the same time, the health care industry is
experiencing significant institutional change, particularly with the
emergence of health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and other
managed care systems.5  The Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback
statute,6 which prohibits payments from one provider to another in
exchange for future referrals, is caught in the crossfire. On the one
hand, it addresses a costly form of fraudulent activity that may be
pursued more vigorously in the overall attempt to control health care
fraud and abuse.7 On the other hand, the statute is broadly worded,
and technically it prohibits certain provider arrangements that are
inevitable and desirable consequences of health care reform in the
United States.8 Courts interpreting the statute will face the challenge
of balancing concerns about the costs of fraud with the need to
1. See Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright, White Collar Crime By Health Care Providers,
67 N.C. L. Rev. 855 (1989) (outlining types of health care fraud based on an extensive survey of
prosecuted cases).
2. It is commonly estimated that at least 10% of Medicare's total spending, or $17 billion
annually, is lost to fraud and abuse. See, for example, Thomas A. Schatz, Medicare Fraud.
Tales from the Gypped, Wall St. J. A8 (Aug. 25, 1995) (quoting June Gibbs Brown, Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services). Some disagree with this estimate.
See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw and Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 Yale J. Reg. 455, 459 (1994)
("There is no empirical evidence to support the popular notion that fraud and abuse add about
10% to U.S. medical costs.").
3. Controlling health care costs became a major policy issue in the 1970s. Paul Starr,
The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine 380-88 (Basic Books, 1982).
4. See David S. Nalven, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: An Enforcement Priority for the
1990s, 38 Boston Bar J. 9 (Oct. 1994) (The federal government is aggressively prosecuting fraud
and abuse by health care providers for the same reason that Willie Sutton robbed banks: its
where the money is.").
5. See James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An Overview of Managed Care
Organizations, 81 Ill. Bar J. 584 (1993) (giving a brief introduction to the concept of managed
care). Managed care is a broad term used to describe health care arrangements that use
prearranged fee structures rather than paying for whatever the provider bills under traditional
fee-for-service reimbursement plans. Id. HMOs, a subset of managed care, agree to provide
medical services for groups of people at prearranged rates. Id. at 585.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 ed.).
7. See Part III.C.
8. See Part III.A.
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encourage health care reform in a fair, practical and consistent
manner.
The anti-kickback statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting
or receiving any remuneration in exchange for future referrals or
future use of a particular good, service, or facility.9 A common exam-
ple of prohibited conduct involves a medical laboratory paying han-
dling fees or referral fees to doctors who send specimens to the labora-
tory.' 0 The statute prohibits not only cash payments, but also remu-
neration in kind.' Thus, for example, a hospital violates the statute
by providing amenities to staff physicians in order to influence them
to refer their patients to that hospital.2 A wide variety of business
9. The statute provides as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a
State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recom-
mending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health
care program, or(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). For exceptions to the statute, see note 69.
As of the 1996 amendments, the words "title XVIII or a State health care program" will be
replaced by "a Federal health care program" wherever they appear. Thus the statute is now
applicable to all federal health care programs, not just to Medicare and Medicaid. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 204(a)(5), 110 Stat.
1936, 1999.
10. See, for example, United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1979)
(laboratory paid defendant doctors $35 for each blood specimen sent to it for analysis).
11. For the full text of the statute see note 9.
12. Examples of physician incentive plans include providing discounted billing and staff
services, paying for continuing education courses, financing travel to conferences, and granting
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conduct potentially falls within the statute, because technically a
violation occurs any time one health care entity gives something to
another as part of an effort to increase its own business.
The broad reach of the statute, confirmed by current caselaw, 13
has caused considerable anxiety in the health care industry.14
Furthermore, the criminalization of this type of conduct is implicated
in a larger debate about the appropriateness of creating criminal
penalties for conduct that is not inherently or obviously criminal. '
Such overcriminalization may compromise due process rights by fail-
ing to give adequate notice of what behavior will result in criminal
prosecution. 16
Recently, in Ratzlaf v. United States,17 the Supreme Court
responded to similar concerns regarding a provision of the Bank
Secrecy Act that makes it illegal to knowingly and willfully structure
financial transactions in order to evade reporting requirements.18 The
Court held that the statutory term "willfully" requires the govern-
ment to prove that a defendant specifically knew that such structur-
ing is illegal. 9 In 1995, the Ninth Circuit applied this holding to the
anti-kickback statute in Hanlester Network v. Shalala,20 requiring the
government to show that defendants who had engaged in prohibited
conduct did so with the specific intent to violate the law.2' Although
several courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have specifically rejected
the Hanlester holding,22 it remains good law in the Ninth Circuit, and
coverage on the hospital's group health insurance plan. Carol Colborn, Fraud and Abuse: Anti-
Kickback Developments and Practical Considerations, 669 PLU/Comm 355, 360-61 (1993).
13. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that intent to in-
duce referrals need not be the sole motivation for making a payment). See Part II.D.
14. See Part I.A.
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal'7: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991) (arguing that
overcriminalization blurs the line between tort and crime and will ultimately weaken criminal
law's social control objective); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notica
Confronting 'Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1995) (arguing
that the use of criminal law should track public expectations of what constitutes criminal
conduct).
16. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law.").
17. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
18. See Part IV.A.
19. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138.
20. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
21. Id. at 1400.
22. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Neufeld, 908
F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995). See also Medical Development Network, Inc. v. Professional
Respiratory Care, 673 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) (holding a contract between a
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it could potentially be adopted by other courts faced with the task of
construing the anti-kickback statute.23
This Note argues that the Hanlester court was right to look to
intent principles in trying to rationalize the broad reach of the stat-
ute, but that requiring a specific intent to violate the law is excessive.
The Ratzlaf definition of "willfully" should be limited to the anti-
structuring statute.24  In interpreting the anti-kickback statute,
courts should instead define "willfully" in the more traditional sense
of requiring a defendant to act deliberately and voluntarily-in short,
with a corrupt intent.25 This definition of "willfully" has been rou-
tinely used by courts both before and since the Ratzlaf holding.26
Moreover, unlike specific intent to violate the law, corrupt intent can
be readily inferred from the circumstances of a given case, using the
same types of evidence that traditionally have been offered in other
health care fraud cases. 27 Requiring a corrupt intent will ensure,
however, that criminal penalties are only imposed on those acting
with a genuine mens rea, or guilty mind.
Part II of this paper provides background, including the legis-
lative history of the anti-kickback statute and case law interpreting
it. Part III explores some of the issues raised by the breadth of the
statute and by the general notion of criminalizing this type of behav-
ior. Part IV concludes that defining "willfully" as requiring a corrupt
intent, but not necessarily a specific intent to violate the law, is a
rational and practical response to the difficulties posed by the breadth
of the anti-kickback statute.
marketing company and a durable medical equipment supplier invalid on the grounds that it
violated the anti-kickback statute).
23. The fact that Ratzaf is still good law means that courts must distinguish the anti-
kickback statute from the anti-structuring statute in order to reject the Hanlester approach.
This may be a factor in influencing some courts to adopt the Hanlester approach.
24. Nothing in the Ratzlaf opinion indicates that its definition of "willfully" applies to
every statute in which the word appears. On the contrary, the Court recognized that "willful"
can have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Ratzaf, 510 U.S. at
141.
25. See notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
26. See note 227 and accompanying text.
27. See notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
Congress created the Medicare/Medicaid system in 1965,28
after several decades of political debate over access to medical care
and the distribution of health care costs in American society.2 9 The
support of the medical profession was considered crucial to both .the
passage and the ultimate success of the legislation.30 To secure this
support, Congress structured the system to replicate the
reimbursement mechanisms of traditional third-party insurance.31
Like third-party payment systems, Meicare/Medicaid reimbursement
structures are extremely generous to providers.32 If a third-party
insurance company absorbs the costs of treatment, neither the patient
nor the provider has any reason to limit consumption of medical
resources.3 The provider, in fact, has an incentive to maximize the
volume of services, even if costs outweigh any benefit to the patient.34
The Medicare/Medicaid system therefore involves the "fee-for-
service" system of third-party payment that is the primary cause of
America's problem with rising health care costs. 35 In a fee-for-service
environment, kickbacks and other forms of illegal remuneration can
be highly profitable. For example, in the case of a laboratory that
makes payments to a doctor for referring a patient, neither the doctor
nor the patient has any incentive to limit the amount of blood work
ordered.3 6 Presumably, doctors will order as much blood work as
possible, regardless of patient need. In other words, the extra pay-
ment the provider receives from the laboratory magnifies the incen-
tives for overutilization inherent in the fee-for-service system.
28. For an overview of the history and original structure of the Medicare and Medicaid
legislation, see Margaret Greenfield, Medicare and Medicaid: The 1965 and 1967 Social
Security Amendments (U. of California, 1968).
29. Id. at 76-77.
30. Starr, Social Transformation of American Medicine at 375 (cited in note 3).
31. Id. Rather than controlling the program directly, the federal government authorizes
private insurance companies to serve as "fiscal intermediaries." Id. The federal government




35. Id. at 385.
36. See notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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A. The Original Legislation (1972-1977). Identifying Bribes and
Kickbacks in Health Care Arrangements
Initially, Medicare and Medicaid were regulated by the general
antifraud section of the Social Security Act.37 This section, however,
contained no specific prohibition of kickback-type activity. 38 In 1972,
as part of the first comprehensive revisions of the Medicare/Medicaid
legislation,39 Congress explicitly outlawed soliciting or offering
"kickbacks, bribes or rebates" to induce patient referrals.40 There was
no intent requirement, but violation of the statute was only a misde-
meanor.41 In passing the legislation, Congress was primarily moti-
vated by a desire to contain costs. 42 A more general concern for regu-
lating the ethical standards of the program, however, was also a mo-
tivating factor.43
A circuit split soon arose over what constituted a kickback,
bribe or rebate.44 Although Congress subsequently amended the stat-
ute to resolve this issue,45 the courts' struggle to define the boundary
between legal and illegal conduct in this context previews some of the
difficulties courts today face in construing the current statute.46 The
courts agreed that Congress intended to use the terms according to
their established and ordinary meanings, 47 but they could not agree on
37. 42 U.S.C. § 408 (1994 ed.).
38. Arguably, the general antifraud statute could have been applied to kickbacks and
other forms of illegal remuneration. David M. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of
Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1861,
1877 n.46 (1989).
39. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1419, codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1720a-1776.
40. Id. §§ 242(b), 242(c), 86 Stat. at 1419-20, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b), 1396(b)
(prior to 1977 amendments).
41. Id. The penalties were a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for a maximum of one
year, or both. Id.
42. See Frankford, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 1877-89 (cited in note 38) C These amendments
were spurred, in large part, by Congress's concern that the Medicare and Medicaid
programs... created substantial incentives for inefficient behavior [and] inflated prices.").
43. David A. Hyman and Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives
in a "Competitive"Health Care Era, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 1133, 1166 (1988).
44. Compare United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979) (defining bribe or kick-
back restrictively, and United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), with United
States v. Topert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980) (defining bribe or kickback expansively) and
United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979) (same). These cases were decided at the
appellate level after the 1977 amendments, but they were construing the original statute.
45. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
46. See Part I.D. (discussing Greber).
47. See, for example, Zacher, 586 F.2d at 914 ("[Where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
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what those meanings encompassed.4 In United States v. Zacher,49 the
Second Circuit held that a nursing home operator who had charged
the families of Medicaid patients four dollars a day to supplement
Medicaid payments was not guilty of receiving bribes. 50 The court
reasoned that because it would not be treated as a bribe for Zacher to
require extra payments from the families of people who had private
insurance, such payments would not be considered bribes in the
Medicaid context.51 The court held that the term "bribe" connoted an
"element of corruption, breach of trust, or violation of duty" that was
not present in the Zacher facts. 52
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Porter,53 held
that physicians who had accepted payments for referring patients to
certain laboratories had not received kickbacks within the meaning of
the statute.M The laboratories in that case used a manual method to
perform a battery of blood tests at a cost of $214 to Medicare. 55 A
laboratory using an automated system would have charged approxi-
mately thirty-five dollars for the same blood work.5 To the extent
that there was any difference in quality between the two types of
laboratories, automated systems were probably superior.57 The de-
fendant doctors, however, sent blood samples to the more expensive
manual laboratories in order to receive the referral payments.58
Medicare therefore paid more than six times as much as necessary for
each procedure, and the doctors directly benefited. Nonetheless, the
court reversed the doctors' convictions because the payments were
authorized by Medicare, the services were legitimately performed,
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind
unless otherwise instructed." (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))).
48. Generally, a bribe is "[a]ny money, goods, right in action, property, thing of value, or
any preferment, advantage, privilege or emolument, or any promise or undertaking to give any,
asked, given, or accepted, with a corrupt intent to induce or influence action, vote, or opinion of
person in any public or official capacity." Black's Law Dictionary 191 (West, 6th ed. 1990). A
kickback is "[p]ayment back by seller of a portion of the purchase price to buyer or public official
to induce purchase or to improperly influence future purchases or leases." Id. at 869.
49. 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 916.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 915.
53. 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 1054.
55. Id. at 1051.
56. Id.




and the statute had not specifically defined "kickback" to include the
conduct in question.59
The Sixth Circuit, however, when faced with a substantially
similar fact pattern in United States v. Tapert,60 held that such con-
duct did violate the statute.61 The defendants in Tapert were osteo-
pathic physicians who accepted payments in return for sending urine
and blood work to Titan Laboratories.62 After a couple of years, the
doctors started to deposit the payments into an escrow account, and
eventually purchased a forty percent interest in the laboratories. 63
The court held that the payments to the doctors were kickbacks,
citing the District Court judge's detailed discussion in support of a
broad legal definition of the term.64
B. Amendments to the Statute (1977-1980): Expanding the Range of
Prohibited Conduct and Increasing Criminal Penalties
In 1977, Congress amended the statute to prohibit receiving or
paying "any remuneration" to induce referrals.65 In so doing,
Congress indicated that the statute was to be interpreted broadly.66
Congress also expressed concern that existing penalties had not ade-
quately deterred illegal practices. 67 The 1977 amendment therefore
upgraded the offense to a felony and increased the maximum fine.
Several years later, however, Congress became concerned that
the statute's lack of a mens rea requirement could result in unfairly
imposing criminal sanctions on individuals who had only inadver-
tently violated the statute.68 Because the offense had been upgraded
59. Id. at 1052-54.
60. 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. at 113.
63. Id. at 114.
64. Id. at 121. See United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410, 414 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(offering a "large body of legal and lexicographical authority confirming a broad[] meaning for
'kickback' ").
65. Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, §§ 4(a),
4(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180, 1182 (1977).
66. See Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, H.R. Rep. No. 95-393(II),
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 1977, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3049 (emphasizing that
"Ik]ickbacks take a number of forms").
67. Id. at 48.
68. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, H.R. Rep. No. 96-1167, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 59,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572 ("The Committee is concerned that criminal penal-
ties may be imposed under current law to an individual whose conduct, while improper, was
inadvertent. Accordingly, the section clarifies current law to assure that only persons who
1997] 1037
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to a felony, this was a serious issue. Amendments in 1980 therefore
added a requirement that the illegal conduct be engaged in
"knowingly and willfully."
After these amendments, the statute appeared in substantially
the same form as it does today. There have, however, been additions
to the third paragraph, which specifically exempts certain practices
from prosecution under the statute.69  One significant exception
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue regu-
lations specifying arrangements that will not be subject to prosecution
knowingly and willfully engage in the prescribed conduct could be subject to criminal sanc-
tions."). This is the extent of the legislative history on the 1980 amendments.
69. Paragraph (3) reads as follows:
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of services or
other entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care
program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and appropriately
reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity under
subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program;
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide em-
ployment relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of
covered items or services;
(C) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person authorized to act
as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or entities who are furnishing
services reimbursed under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health
care program if-
(i) the person has a written contract, with each such individual or entity,
which specifies the amount to be paid the person, which amount may be
a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the value of the purchases made
by each such individual or entity under the contract, and
(ii) in the case of an entity that is a provider of services (as defined in section
1395x(u) of this title), the person discloses (in such form and manner as
the Secretary requires) to the entity and, upon request, to the Secretary
the amount received from each such vendor with respect to purchases
made by or on behalf of the entity;
(D) a waiver of any coinsurance under part B of subchapter XVIII of this chapter
by a Federally qualified health care center with respect to an individual who
qualifies for subsidized services under a provision of the Public Health
Service Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.]; and
(E) any payment practice specified by the Secretary in regulations promulgated
pursuant to section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program
Protection Act of 1987.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3).
The 1996 amendments added new subsection (F):
(F) any remuneration between an organization and an individual or entity pro-
viding items or services, or a combination thereof, pursuant to a written
agreement between the organization and the individual or entity if the
organization is an eligible organization under section 1876 or if the written
agreement, through a risk-sharing arrangement, places the individual or
entity at substantial financial risk for the cost or utilization of the items or
services, or a combination thereof, which the individual or entity is obligated
to provide.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 110 Stat. at 2007. See Part H.C.
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under the statute.70 The Secretary has created eleven such "safe har-
bor" provisions. 71
C. 1996 Amendments: Health Care Reform in an Era
of Managed Care
As part of a comprehensive health care reform effort, 72
Congress in 1996 stiffened penalties associated with health care fraud
generally,73 increased funding for health care fraud enforcement 74 and
extended the anti-kickback statute to all federal health programs. 75
These amendments reveal Congress's resolve to fight fraud and abuse
in health care with increased vigor. At the same time, however,
Congress recognized the potentially unfair breadth of the anti-kick-
back statute. It thus authorized the issuance of advisory opinions on
whether certain conduct violates the anti-kickback statute, 76 and it
added a new exception to the statute for certain "risk sharing"
provider arrangements. 77
At one time, the Health Care Financing Administration's
Office of Program Integrity issued advisory opinions in individual
cases.78 In 1981 it ceased this practice on the basis that it is
70. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E).
71. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1996). The eleven safe harbors are for investment interests,
space rental, equipment rental, personal services and management contracts, sale of practice,
referral services, warranties, discounts, employees, group purchasing organizations, and waiver
of beneficiary coinsurance and deductible amounts. All the safe harbors specify certain stan-
dards that must be met before the conduct is immunized from prosecution.
72. In 1995, a comprehensive health care reform bill was passed by both the House and
Senate, then vetoed by President Clinton. See Historic House Medicare Vote Affirms GOP
Determination, 53 Cong. Q. 3206 (Oct. 21, 1995); Conferees Work Furiously to Overhaul
Medicare, 53 Cong. Q. 3456 (Nov. 11, 1995); GOP Scores on Medicare, But Foes Aren't Done, 53
Cong. Q. 3535 (Nov. 18, 1995). In 1996, another comprehensive health care reform bill passed
Congress and was signed by the President. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, to be codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
The main focus of the bill is to ensure that individuals who are already sick can keep insurance
even if they lose or leave jobs. Kennedy, Kassebaum Steer Insurance Bill to Safety, 54 Cong. Q.
2197 (Aug. 3, 1996). The bill was co-sponsored by Republican Senator Nancy Landon
Kassebaum of Kansas and Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. President
Clinton was a strong supporter of the bill. Id.
73. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act §§ 211-218, 110 Stat. at 2003-
2009.
74. Id. § 201, 110 Stat. at 1994. The bill allocates $104 million for fiscal year 1997, to be
increased by 15% each fiscal year until 2003. Id.
75. Id. § 204, 110 Stat. at 1999.
76. Id. § 205(b), 110 Stat. at 2001-02. See notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
77. Id. § 216, 110 Stat. at 2007-08. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
78. Eugene Tillman, Scope of the Conference, in Jeanie M. Johnson, ed., Medicare Fraud
and Abuse: Understanding the Law 9-10 (National Health Lawyers Assoc., 1986).
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inappropriate for an administrative agency to issue advisory opinions
on criminal conduct.79 In the 1996 amendments, however, Congress
specifically authorized the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") to begin issuing advisory
opinions.8 0 These opinions will be available to the public, but will be
binding only on the HHS Secretary and the party requesting the
opinion.81 HHS is currently soliciting public comments on how the
advisory opinion process should work.82 President Clinton, however,
who was a strong supporter of the health care reform bill generally, is
calling for the repeal of the advisory opinion authorization on the
grounds that providers might obtain an opinion under false pretenses
and then use it as a shield against prosecution.83
Congress also added an exception to the statute for "risk shar-
ing" provider arrangements.8 4 This exception applies to remuneration
between an individual or organization and a health care provider if a
written contract between the parties puts the provider at "substantial
financial risk" for the cost or utilization of services.85 The exception is
intended to protect certain efficient and cost-reducing forms of health
care delivery that have emerged since the statute was originally
enacted.8 The standards governing this exception are currently being
developed through a negotiated rulemaking process involving the
HHS and various interest groups.87
D. United States v. Greber: Judicial Endorsement of the Current
Anti-Kickback Statute's Broad Reach
Although the semantic issue of what constitutes a bribe or
kickback is no longer a concern, courts still face substantially similar
issues in defining the boundaries of permissible and impermissible
79. Id.
80. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 205(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2001.
81. Id. § 205(b)(4)(A), 110 Stat. at 2002.
82. HHS IG to Seek Public Comments on New Advisory Opinion Process, 5 Health L. Rptr.
(BNA) 1279 (Aug. 29, 1996).
83. Clinton Proposes to Repeal Three Recently Enacted Provisions, 5 Health L. Rptr.
(BNA) 1341 (Sept. 12, 1996).
84. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act § 216, 110 Stat. at 2007-08. See
note 69.
85. Id.
86. 1R 3103 Creates Kickback Exception, Intermediate Sanctions for Risk HMOs, 5 Health
L. Rptr. (BNA) 1281 (Aug. 29, 1996).
87. Managed Care Safe Harbor Rulemaking Underway, But Deadlines Unrealistic, 5
Health L. Rptr. (BNA) 1523 (Oct. 17, 1996). The legislation originally set a target date of
January 1, 1997 for an interim final rule, but an official from the Inspector General's Office has
said that the negotiated rulemaking process typically takes from nine months to a year. Id.
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conduct under the statute. The line between legitimate business
arrangements and illegitimate profit schemes can be difficult to draw.
The most prominent appellate decision pursuing this issue is the
Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Greber,88 which interprets
the statute extremely broadly. Congress has not contradicted this
decision in subsequent amendments.89
Dr. Greber was a osteopath specializing in cardiology.9 He
was also president of a company called Cardio-Med, Inc., which sup-
plied other physicians with diagnostic services, including a cardiac
device known as a "Holter-monitor."91 Cardio-Med billed Medicare for
the device and forwarded a portion of the payment received to the
referring physician.92 The government indicted Dr. Greber for paying
remuneration to the physicians in exchange for referrals. 93
Dr. Greber's main defense was that the payments were for
services rendered by the referring physicians in interpreting the
results of the Holter-monitor test.9 4 He argued that legitimate pay-
ments for services rendered did not violate the statute unless the only
purpose behind them was to induce future referrals improperly.9 5
That is, Dr. Greber argued that because he was paying the physicians
for legitimate services as well as for making referrals, he was not
violating the statue. The court rejected this claim, holding that the
statutory term "remuneration" implies a service rendered.96 Thus, by
adding the term "remuneration" to the statute in 1977, Congress
intended to prohibit improper payments even if some service is ren-
dered.97 The court noted a "potential for unnecessary drain on the
Medicare system" exists even if the physician does provide service in
exchange for the remuneration.98
A substantial body of caselaw defining the limits of the anti-
kickback statute has not emerged. Greber's broad interpretation of
88. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
89. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d 20, 31 (1st Cir. 1989) C'[The fact
that Congress, in reenacting the substantive sections of the Medicare Fraud statute did not
change them, implies that Congress approved prior interpretations such as Greber.").
90. Greber, 760 F.2d at 69.




95. Id. at 71.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 72.
98. Id. at 71.
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the statute thus effectively states the current law in this area.99
Recently, however, courts have begun to look to mens rea as a way of
limiting this broad interpretation. In 1995, the Ninth Circuit placed a
formidable limit on the statute by requiring a specific intent to violate
the law in order to exclude providers from Medicare and Medicaid.' °0
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit rejected this approach, but did require a
heightened intent standard.101 Thus intent is beginning to function as
the locus for resolution of the issues surrounding the anti-kickback
statute. The next section explores these issues.
III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
A. The Over-Inclusiveness of the Anti-Kickback Statute
In broadening the statute to prohibit any remuneration in-
tended to induce future referrals,102 Congress achieved its goal of
extending the statute's reach beyond payments that fall neatly within
the ordinary definitions of "bribe" and "kickback."0 3 This is a rational
move in that it makes the law more flexible and therefore better able
to deal with emerging types of fraudulent or abusive behaviors. Now,
however, the statute is arguably too broad, in that it potentially can
be applied to a variety of perfectly legitimate and even desirable
arrangements. 10 4 Some accepted business practices and certain cost-
containment innovations are at least technical violations of the stat-
ute. 0 5
For example, a hospital might pay for its staff physicians to
attend conferences in their areas of specialty.16 Technically, this
99. See notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
100. Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400. See Part IV.B.
101. Jain, 93 F.3d at 439-41.
102. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
103. See note 48 and accompanying text.
104. See Gregory Miller, The Greber Case, in Jeanie M. Johnson, ed., Medicare Fraud and
Abuse: Understanding the Law 15 (National Health Lawyers Assoc., 1986) (addressing the
argument that after the Greber case, the accepted interpretation of the statute is so broad that
it should be amended).
105. See James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute, 15 Health
Affairs 118, 118 (Winter 1996) (stating that "the extremely broad interpretation of the law
serves as a major potential obstacle to the continued evolution and rationalization of the health
care marketplace in response to competitive market forces and pressures to contain costs").
106. In May 1992, one of the fraud alerts issued by the Office of the Inspector General
specifically listed this as a suspect activity. Colborn, 669 PLI/Comm at 361
(cited in note 12).
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practice is paying remuneration to induce the physicians to refer their
patients to the hospital. It is also arguably harmless. Moreover,
giving incentives to physicians might be the only way for rural or
other hospitals to attract competent physicians. 1°7 Another example
might be a pacemaker company's providing educational resources to
doctors who use its product-again a seemingly harmless activity.
Although these arrangements are unlikely to be prosecuted,108 the fact
remains that the statute technically proscribes them. 10 9  One
commentator has described the situation as a legal "speakeasy,"
where sipping sherry is winked at and only loud and obnoxious
drunks are prosecuted.110 This situation, with its widespread
tolerance for technical violations, its excessive dependence on
prosecutorial discretion, and the general uncertainty it provokes,
could promote a fundamental disrespect for the law.
Lack of clarity about what is really illegal under the anti-
kickback statute generates corresponding uncertainty about whether
the statute can accomplish its goals of containing unnecessary costs
and promoting ethical behavior in the health care industry. For one
thing, the current statute may deter behavior that is a desirable part
of the reform movement.,, The current congressional agenda aims to
reduce costs and raise efficiency in health care."2 The anti-kickback
statute, however, even with the new "risk sharing" exception, may
prohibit some of the joint ventures and other collective activity
necessary to fulfill this mandate."3 In fact, the anti-kickback statute
is overtly hostile to the concept of medicine as a for-profit
enterprise."4 The statute's goals are therefore fundamentally out of
sync with reform efforts that focus on creating competitive pressures
to lower the costs of health care.
In 1977, when Congress amended the anti-kickback statute to
bring it to its present form, fee-for-service reimbursement was very
107. Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1144 (cited in note 43).
108. See Richard Kusserow, The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the Safe
Harbor Regulations-What's Next?, 2 Healthmatrix 49 (1992) (former Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services describing the process by which United States
attorneys decide whether or not to prosecute a particular violation).
109. Physician incentive plans and sales incentives do not fall within any of the safe har-
bors. See note 71 and accompanying text.
110. James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. 205, 218 (1996).
111. Blumstein, 15 Health Affairs at 119 (cited in note 105).
112. Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1188 (cited in note 43).
113. Blumstein, 15 Health Affairs at 121 (cited in note 105).
114. Id. at 119.
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much the norm." 5 Health care providers thus had great incentives to
overutilize the system and generate unnecessary costs.116 In this en-
vironment, it made sense to target financial arrangements that could
lead to wasteful or improper patient referrals and unnecessary care.
Some emerging methods of care, however, have essentially reversed
these traditional incentives.1 7 For example, in 1983, Medicare and
Medicaid switched to a prospective payment system, under which
hospitals are reimbursed at a rate set in advance according to diag-
nosis-related groups ("DRGs")."5 If the hospital can treat the patient
for less than the fixed reimbursement, it makes money."9
Collective activity is necessary to any economic venture, and it
is particularly important in the health care industry; a single patient
might encounter several physicians, laboratories, radiologists, home
health care nurses, hospitals, and equipment suppliers in the course
of a single illness. 20 Allowing these entities to work together might
result in lower health care costs, but patient flow might also
necessitate payments from some group to another that could be
construed as illegal remuneration.
Before the 1996 amendments, the statute technically prohib-
ited transactions that are essential to managed care.' 2' For example,
if a provider negotiated discounted fees or provided other remunera-
tion to a covered group in exchange for assurances about patient vol-
115. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional fee for service sys-
tem). See also Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1156-66 (cited in note 43)
(discussing whether the rationales for the fraud and abuse statute apply in an increasingly
market-oriented health care industry).
116. See note 34 and accompanying text.
117. See Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1133 (cited in note 43) ("Efforts
to maintain or increase market share have led health care providers to... develop incentive
programs that reward efficiency and cost-effective care.").
118. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72,
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww. See generally Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 Yale J. Reg. 499
(1990).
119. Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1138-39 (cited in note 43).
120. See Frankford, 89 Colum L. Rev. at 1869-76 (cited in note 38) (giving a detailed
economic analysis of collective activity among health care providers).
121. See discussion of the 1996 amendments in Part II.C. Even before these amendments,
there was a safe harbor provision for price reductions offered to health plans. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.
The provision requires contracts between providers and health plans to be longer than one year,
and to set in advance the covered items and services and the methodology for computing
payments. Id. It is difficult to set payments in advance, however, because the number of people
who will be enrolled is not known. Legislation Has Not Kept Pace with Managed Care, Attorney
Says, 1 Managed Care Rptr. (BNA) 8 (July 5, 1995). The safe harbor provisions thus did not
adequately address HMOs and capitation systems. Final Managed Care Safe Harbors Still Do
Not Protect Many Arrangements, 2 Managed Care Rptr. (BNA) 197 (Feb. 28, 1996).
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ume, technically it ran afoul of the law.122 Many other collective
transactions that are fundamental to the emergence of managed care
were potentially prohibited by the statute. 123 Indeed, some com-
mentators have suggested that the anti-kickback statute has signifi-
cantly inhibited the development of efficient, cost-reducing forms of
health care delivery in America. 124
In 1996, Congress addressed this issue by amending the stat-
ute to exempt certain "risk sharing" arrangements.1 25 This new excep-
tion applies to remuneration between individuals or organizations
and providers if there is a written agreement between the parties that
places the provider "at a substantial financial risk for the cost or
utilization of the items or services... which [the provider] is
obligated to provide." 26 The boundaries governing this exception are
currently being drawn.2 7 Hopefully, the fully drawn exception will
provide much needed reassurance to the managed care industry.128
Nevertheless, the statute's broad reach is likely to remain a
source of anxiety. For one thing, the scope of the risk-sharing excep-
tion has not yet been defined. 29 It may be that the exception will be
construed narrowly. Moreover, the statute's reach is not necessarily
limited to arrangements between providers and other health care
entities. There are a number of other relationships in the health care
industry that potentially could be subject to prosecution under the
statute.
For example, a Florida Appeals Court recently held that a
contract between a durable medical equipment supplier and a
marketing company was void because it violated the anti-kickback
law.'13 Under the contract, the durable medical equipment supplier
agreed to pay a marketing company a percentage of all business de-
veloped by the company's marketing strategy.13' No doctor, hospital
or other provider was a party to the contract. The decision impacts
122. Blumstein, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. at 213 (cited in note 110).
123. Id. at 213-19.
124. See Hyman and Williamson, 19 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. at 1133-35 (cited in note 43).
125. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
126. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 110 Stat. at 2007.
127. See note 110 and accompanying text.
128. See Blumstein, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. at 230 (cited in note 110) ("If ultimately
enacted... the Kassebaum-Kennedy legislation... would be significant and would change the
impact of the antikickback provisions.").
129. See note 87 and accompanying text.
130. Medical Development Network, Inc. v. Professional Respiratory Care/Home Medical




the health care industry in two ways. First, it emphasizes the fact
that the anti-kickback statute can be applied to any type of business
that involves services or goods that are reimbursable under a federal
health care program. Second, and more fundamentally, it means that
the health care industry has to be very careful about consulting with
marketing or public relations specialists.132
This second point illustrates one of the main tensions between
the anti-kickback law and the health care reform effort in America:
the anti-kickback law is fundamentally opposed to the idea of medi-
cine as a for-profit industry. 133 It simply does not recognize the possi-
bility that health care providers can be financially motivated and still
provide quality care. Much of the health care reform effort, however,
involves creating financial incentives for physicians to provide cost-
effective treatment. The anti-kickback statute is thus somewhat
inconsistent with the comprehensive effort to control health care
costs. Although it may have effectively targeted the kinds of abuses
that occur in a traditional fee-for-service environment, it may do more
harm than good in the contemporary reform context. 34
It is also possible that the anti-kickback statute could be
applied to renumeration between a provider and the patient. In a fee-
for-service environment, referrals and remuneration typically flow
from one provider to another. For example, to induce referrals a
laboratory might pay a doctor, or a durable medical equipment dealer
might recompense a hospital. 35  In an HMO, however, certain
incentives that flow from provider to consumer could be considered
illegal. 1 6 For example, an HMO might reward high-risk expectant
mothers with child car seats formaking appropriate prenatal visits. 137
This could be construed as a violation of the anti-kickback statute. 138
Similarly, HMOs naturally want to enroll as many members as
possible, and they want any enrollees to be as healthy as possible.1 39
An HMO, then, might offer certain incentives to get healthier groups
132. See Anti-Kickback Law Covers Non-Providers, Florida State Appeals Court Affirms, 5
Health L. Rptr. (BNA) 860 (June 6, 1996).
133. Blumstein, 15 Health Affairs at 119 (cited in note 105).
134. See Blumstein, 22 Am. J. L. & Med. at 207-10 (cited in note 110) (discussing the
incentives for overutilization existing in the health care field at the time the anti-kickback
statute was enacted).
135. Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud By Health Care Providers, 38 Vill. L.
Rev. 1003, 1033 (1993).
136. Id.
137. Legislation Has Not Kept Pace with Managed Care, 1 Managed Care Rptr. at 9 (cited
in note 121).
138. Id.
139. Bucy, 38 Vill. L. Rev. at 1033 (cited in note 135).
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of people to enroll..140 If characterized as "remuneration" paid to
selected consumers to get their business, these incentives might be
illegal under the anti-kickback statute.141
B. Civil Remedies as an Alternative to Overcriminalization
In addition to concerns about inclusiveness, the statute raises
general issues about the proper scope of criminal conduct and the
legitimacy of using criminal penalties to deter and punish this sort of
behavior. Criminal penalties are by no means the only way to deter,
redress, *or punish undesirable conduct on the part of
Medicare/Medicaid providers. Civil and administrative penalties,
including fines1 4 2 and program exclusion43 can have a devastating
impact on providers.14 The availability of these sorts of civil penalties
suggests that criminal sanctions should be reserved for conduct that
is immediately recognizable as corrupt.
As Professor John Coffee has noted, statutes like the anti-
kickback statute have the undesirable effect of blurring the line be-
tween tort law and criminal law.145 Criminal law, he argues, seeks to
punish behavior that society recognizes as fundamentally wrong. 146
Tort law, in contrast, strives to "price" behavior by weighing its social
value against the harm it produces. 147 Criminalizing conduct that
should be priced, he concludes, will ultimately dilute the power of the
criminal law to effect social control.148
Professor Coffee's observations suggest that as a criminal pro-
vision, the anti-kickback statute should be applied only to behavior
that society recognizes as fundamentally wrong. Undesirable behav-
ior that is not fundamentally corrupt, on the other hand, should be
handled through civil and administrative "pricing" remedies. This
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, the government can recover fines of
$5,000 to $10,000 per claim plus treble damages and costs.
143. HHS has the power the bring actions to exclude from Medicare/Medicaid participation
any health care provider it deems to be in violation of the anti-kickback statute. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7(b).
144. Prosecutors have incentives to bring civil, instead of criminal, actions beciuse civil
penalties are potentially much greater than criminal ones, and because intent need not be
proven in the civil arena. Nalven, 33 Boston Bar J. at 17 (cited in note 4).
145. See Coffee, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 193 (cited in note 15).
146. Id. at 193-94.
147. Id. at 194.
148. Id. at 201.
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distinction should be borne in mind by courts aiming to formulate a
workable intent standard under the anti-kickback statute.
C. The Anti-Kickback Statute and the Health Care Reform
Effort in America
For several reasons, the issues raised by the anti-kickback
statute are likely to become even more pressing in coming years.
First, the health care industry in America is changing rapidly, but in
a piecemeal fashion. 149 This transition period will provoke new
opportunities for fraud, particularly in areas not yet regulated. 150
Moreover, health care reform will likely mean that doctors and
hospitals will make less money,15' which may increase the temptation
to resort to fraudulent practices. 5 2
At the same time, enforcing health care fraud laws has become
a top government priority. 153 The end of the Cold War has freed a
number of FBI agents for assignment to health care fraud task
units. 154 The Department of Justice recently formed a special unit
devoted to prosecuting instances of health care fraud. 55 President
Clinton has launched "Operation Restore Trust," which aims to
regulate health care providers, particularly home health care, nursing
homes, and durable equipment suppliers. 56 The government has even
established a special hotline for Americans to report instances of
fraud and abuse. 57 In addition to increased enforcement in the health
care area, government agencies are increasingly making use of
standard criminal investigatory techniques like search warrants,
asset forfeiture, and undercover sting operations. 58  Indeed, one
149. Bucy, 38 Vill. L. Rev. at 1008 (cited in note 135).
150. Id.
151. Glenn Ruffenach, Scams on the Rise in Health Insurance, Wall St. J. at 27 (June 22,
1988).
152. Id.
153. Nalven, 38 Boston Bar J. at 9 (cited in note 4). In 1996 Congress allocated
significantly more money to health care fraud enforcement. See note 74 and accompanying text.
154. Charles H. Roistacher and Jack Y. Chorowsky, End of Cold War Frees FBI to Target
Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 10 HealthSpan 3, 3 (1993).
155. Nalven, 38 Boston Bar J. at 10 (cited in note 4).
156. HHS Fact Sheet Concerning HHS' Operation Restore Trust, Medicare and Medicaid
Guide (BNA) 43,213. The program will use funds generated from enforcement activities for
expanded enforcement efforts. Id.
157. Id.
158. Roistacher and Chorowsky, 10 HealthSpan at 4-5 (cited in note 154).
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commentator has described health care as a "growth area" for
prosecutors. 159
Increased enforcement efforts may lead to more prosecutions
in gray areas. Moreover, courts are beginning to allow private
plaintiffs to sue violators of the anti-kickback statute under the qui
tam provisions of the False Claims Act.160 Thus the difficult questions
surrounding the anti-kickback statute may require answers in the
near future. Currently, prosecutors must be relied on to exercise
discretion concerning what conduct to prosecute under the broad
statute.1 61 Prosecutors may also decline cases where it would be
difficult to prove intent.1 62 Grand juries may perform a weeding-out
function as well.16s Despite these safeguards, however, the
uncertainty surrounding potential application of the statute remains
a pressing problem. With the government taking the offensive on
health care fraud, this uncertainty will only increase.
IV. DEFINING "WILLFULLY" TO FURTHER THE STATUTE'S GOALS
WITHOUT VIOLATING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
A. Ratzlaf v. United States
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Ratzlaf v. United States,
an important case construing the term "willfully" in a regulatory
statute. 164 Waldemar Ratzlaf tried to give a Las Vegas casino
$100,000 cash towards a gambling debt.165 A casino official told him
that cash transactions over $10,000 had to be reported to the
159. Miller, The Greber Case, in Johnson, ed., Medicare Fraud and Abuse at 17 (cited in
note 104).
160. See, for example, United States ex. rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). See also Michael J. Astrue, Attacking the Kickback Violations of
Competitors, 10 HealthSpan 3 (1993); Robert Fabrikant, Health Care Reform: The Use of Anti-
Kickback Statutes in Private Litigation, and the Need for an Antitrust-Type Approach, 700
PLTJComm 453 (1994).
161. See Blumstein, 15 Health Affairs at 123 (cited in note 105) (attributing a lack of tough
law enforcement partly to a belief that "much technically illegal activity is either harmless or
downright essential in a market-driven health care environmene').
162. Kusserow, 2 Healthmatrix at 68 (cited in note 108).
163. Bucy, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 878 (cited in note 1).
164. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
165. Id. at 137.
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government. 16 6 To avoid the reporting requirement, Ratzlaf obtained
cashier's checks for less than $10,000 each to pay the casino. 167 In
doing so, he violated a law making it illegal to knowingly and willfully
"structure" transactions in order to evade the reporting
requirements. 16 8 Ratzlaf admitted that he was purposely evading the
requirements. 169 He argued on appeal, however, that in order to be
convicted for "willful" conduct, he first had to know that structuring
was illegal. 70
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that in order
to give full effect to the statutory term "willfully," a defendant must
know his conduct is unlawful. 171 A variety of due process concerns
motivated the Court,172 including the rule of lenity in criminal
statutory construction 173 and the need to give adequate notice of the
anti-structuring law. 174 Most importantly, the Court expressed con-
cern that structuring is not inherently or obviously evil. 175 To demon-
strate that structuring is not "inevitably nefarious," 176 the Court cited
the example of a small business operator who wishes to avoid report-
ing requirements in order to reduce the risk of an IRS audit. 7
The Court acknowledged that ignorance of the law is generally
no defense to a criminal charge. 78 It reasoned, however, that
Congress had decreed otherwise in this instance by including the
166. Id. Banks and other financial institutions must report cash transactions over $10,000
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5313. The statute is part of the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, Tit. II, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970), which was designed to prevent
the use of banks as intermediaries for criminal activity.
167. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137. The casino gave Ratzlaf the use of a limousine and assigned
a casino employee to help him go to various banks around town. Id.
168. 31 U.S.C. § 5324. Ratzlaf was prosecuted under 31 U.S.C. § 5322, which imposed
criminal penalties on those who "willfully" violated § 5324. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137. After the
Ratzlaf decision, Congress added a criminal penalty to § 5324 which does not require a "willful"
violation. Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253.
169. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140.
170. Id. at 138.
171. Id.
172. See Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of "Willful" and the
Demands of Due Process, 28 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 397 (1995) (discussing the due process
issues Ratzlaf raised).
173. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 148 ("[W]ere we to find [the] 'willfulness' requirement
ambiguous ... we would resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant.").
174. Id.
175. Id. at 146 C'[W]e are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously
'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defen-
dant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring.").
176. Id. at 144.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 149.
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word "willfully" in the structuring statute. 17 9 Interestingly, the Court
admitted that the legislative history of the statute suggested other-
wise,'8 but it declined to use legislative history to "cloud a statutory
text that is clear.181 In any event, the Court in effect established an
"ignorance of the law" defense to a structuring charge.
B. Hanlester Network v. Shalala
To date, there have been few appellate decisions construing the
reach of the current anti-kickback statute. In 1995, however, the
Ninth Circuit, in Hanlester Network v. Shalala,182 issued an opinion
that may have a significant impact on future jurisprudence in this
area. At the very least, the decision represents one jurisdiction's
sensitivity to the issues raised by the statute's expansiveness.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute's requirement
that the defendant engage in the prohibited conduct "knowingly and
willfully" meant that the defendant had to have a specific intent to
violate the law. 83
Hanlester Network was a corporation that owned medical
laboratories. 18 It sold limited partnership shares in the enterprise to
physicians'18 It also entered into a "master laboratory service agree-
ment" with Smithkline laboratories, through which Smithkline would
perform management services and Hanlester would send eighty to
ninety percent of its testing to Smithkline facilities.186 The Inspector
General of the HIIS determined that Hanlester had violated the anti-
kickback statute by offering and paying remuneration to physicians in
exchange for referrals, and by soliciting and receiving remuneration
from Smithkline in exchange for referrals.187 The Inspector General
proposed excluding the physicians from Medicare for varying periods
of time.8 8
179. Id.
180. Id. at 147-48.
181. Id. at 148.
182. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
183. Id. at 1400.
184. Id. at 1394-95.
185. Id.
186. Id.




The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory term "willful" re-
quires proof of a specific intent to do something the law forbids. 189
Applying this requirement to the facts of the Hanlester case, the court
held that in order to be excluded, the defendants had to have known
that there was a statute prohibiting paying or receiving remuneration
in exchange for referrals, and they had to have engaged in the illegal
conduct with the specific intent to violate that statute.'9 While a
heightened intent requirement is appropriate given the broad sweep
of the anti-kickback statute, this paper argues that the specific intent
requirement the Hanlester court imposed is excessive and impractical.
The Hanlester case illuminates a larger problem with the
criminalization of regulatory and economic crimes. 191 Unlike murder,
arson, rape and other traditional crimes, regulatory and economic
crimes are not things people presumptively know are prohibited by
law. Congress can transform previously legitimate conduct into
criminal activity with the passage of appropriate legislation. The
newly criminalized conduct may not be obviously or inherently
wrong. 92 In this context, it is often difficult to apply traditional
principles of criminal intent. The fact that a defendant intends to do
a certain act, in other words, may not be enough to establish criminal
intent, if the conduct is not inherently or clearly immoral.
C. United States v. Jain: The Eighth Circuit's Heightened
Intent Approach
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected the
RatzlaflHanlester approach to the anti-kickback statute in United
States v. Jain.93 It recognized, however, that the statute's breadth
calls for a heightened intent standard.94 In Jain, a psychologist was
accused of receiving payments for referring patients to a psychiatric
hospital. 195 Dr. Jain claimed that the payments were made for
marketing services. 196 His defense was thus based on the factual
claim that he had not received payments in exchange for referring
189. Id. at 1400 (citing United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1983)).
190. Id.
191. Environmental law is another example of a regulatory area that has seen increasing
criminalization. See generally Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal
Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 Envir. L. 1165 (1995).
192. See generally Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita
Crimes, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1301 (1995).
193. 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
194. Id. at 440.
195. Id. at 438.
196. Id. at 438-39.
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patients. Nevertheless, on appeal, the court analyzed his claim that
the district court had erred by failing to instruct the jury that the
defendant had to have a specific intent to violate the law in order to
be convicted.197
Dr. Jain argued that the Ratzlaf specific intent standard
should be applied to the anti-kickback statute.98 The government
argued that the "willfully" requirement should be satisfied by
"consciousness of the act."' 99 The court, however, affirmed the district
court's approach, which it described as a "middle ground."2®  The
district court had instructed the jury that "the word 'willfully' means
unjustifiably and wrongfully, known to be such by the
defendant .... 20 1
The court reasoned that the statute at issue in Ratzlaf was
different from the anti-kickback statute because it made it a crime to
violate willfully another statute. 2 2 The anti-kickback statute, on the
other hand, makes it a crime to willfully engage in certain conduct.203
The court, however, noted that the anti-kickback statute is like the
statute in Ratzlaf in that both statutes potentially apply to conduct
that is not "inevitably nefarious."24 This breadth justified the height-
ened intent requirement imposed by the district court.205
At least one other district court has also declined to follow the
Hanlester holding. In United States v. Neufeld,206 the Southern
District of Ohio faced the issue of whether the anti-kickback statute is
unconstitutionally vague. The court recognized the need to impose a
rigid scienter requirement to balance the statute's breadth.20 7 The
court, however, did not go as far as the Hanlester court did in
requiring that doctors actually intend to violate the anti-kickback
197. Id. at 440. The court noted, however, that because mens rea was not at issue, even if
the district court had erred in its instruction, it was harmless error. Id. at 441.
198. Id. at 440.
199. Id. (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 209 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
200. Id.
201. Id. The district court derived this language from Edward J. Devitt, Charles B.
Blackmar, and Kevin F. O'Malley, 2 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 30.05 (West, 4th
ed. 1990).
202. Jain, 93 F.3d at 441.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 440 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144).
205. Id.
206. 908 F. Supp. at 497. Caremark, a home infusion company, paid Dr. Neufeld to develop
treatment and educational programs for its staff in connection with a new home health program
for AIDS patients. Id. at 493. Dr. Neufeld was indicted for violating the anti-kickback statute
and brought a motion to dismiss on vagueness grounds, which the court denied. Id. at 497.
207. Id. at 497.
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statute.2 8  The court stated that a definition of "willful" that
encompasses an intent to do a wrongful act would better serve the
goals of the statute.29 It refrained, however, from formulating a more
precise standard.21°
D. The Inapplicability of Ratzlaf to the Anti-Kickback Statute
Leaving aside the issue of whether Ratzlaf itself was correctly
decided, 2 1 there are strong arguments against extending its applica-
tion to the anti-kickback statute. First, the structuring law at issue
in Ratzlaf prohibits trying to evade another law.212 Actual knowledge
of both laws thus seems to be more germane to the intent issue than
knowledge of the law would be in the case of the illegal remunerations
law, which targets core behavior. Second, any kind of criminal intent
is difficult to prove in the context of health care, where regulations
are complex23 and where courts usually give a great deal of deference
to physician judgment.214 While a jury might be able to infer specific
intent to violate a money laundering law, such an inference will be
very difficult to draw in the context of health care provider
arrangements. 2 5 Third, although the Ratzlaf court felt that the
general public could not be presumed to know that structuring is
illegal, health care providers, as professionals, arguably can be
presumed to know the regulations affecting the health care
industry.2 6 In this sense, it may be appropriate to hold health care
providers to a higher standard. Congress certainly did not intend to
give health care providers an incentive to fail to get legal advice
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. ('The Court hesitates from embarking on an exact definition of the scienter re-
quirement at this time").
211. Justice Blackmun, writing for the four Ratzlaf dissenters, argued that the majority's
holding lacked support in the statutory text and in the legislative history. 510 U.S. at 150-51
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Blackmun stressed that structuring is not poten-
tially innocent conduct. Id. at 155-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212. See note 202 and accompanying text.
213. Bucy, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 877 (cited in note 1).
214. Id. at 876.
215. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 3.5(t) at 226 (West, 2d
ed. 1986) C'[A defendants] thoughts must be gathered from his words.., and actions in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances").
216. The anti-kickback statute targets behavior that is grounds for professional discipline
in some states. See, for example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3713 (West, 1989); Cal. Labor Code
§ 3215 (1996); Col. Rev. Stat. § 12-36-125; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 225, § 60/22.A(14) (Smith-Hurd,
1993); N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530.18; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.22(B) (Baldwin, 1995); Wash. Rev.
Code § 19.68.010 (1989).
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before engaging in business ventures, or otherwise to avoid learning
the law of the industry.
Moreover, it is fundamentally absurd to impose a requirement
of specific intent to violate the law in order to mitigate the effects of a
statute so broad that no one knows what the law really is. The level
of scienter a statute requires is an important factor in a vagueness
inquiry.217 Indeed, the Hanlester court specifically relied on its inter-
pretation of the anti-kickback statute's "knowing and willful" re-
quirement in holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague.218 Yet the ultimate holding of the case is that the defendants
cannot be convicted unless they "engage in prohibited conduct with
the specific intent to disobey the law."219 This creates a significant
gap in liability: the law is not too vague because it requires defen-
dants to act willfully, but the defendants cannot act willfully unless
the law is sufficiently clear for them to form a specific intent to violate
it.
The word "willfully," though often used in criminal statutes,
does not have one precise and authoritative definition.220 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is susceptible to different
meanings, depending on the context in which it is used.21 Nothing in
the Ratzlaf opinion indicates that the court meant its definition of
"willfully" to apply in any other context than that of structuring
financial transactions. In the specific context of the anti-kickback
statute, an alternative definition of "willfully" can and should be for-
mulated.
E. Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of "Willfully"
The anti-kickback statute should require an intent beyond the
mere intent to give or receive remuneration in exchange for receiving
or providing patient referrals. Neither of these exchanges is in itself
evidence of a "guilty mind." A more meaningful intent standard
would speak to the main issue: did the health care provider act with
a corrupt purpose?
217. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-500 (1982).
218. Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1397-98.
219. Id. at 1400.
220. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141 r' 'Villful,' this Court has recognized, is a 'word of many
meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often... influenced by its context.") (quoting Spies v. United




The statute requires that the prohibited conduct be engaged in
"knowingly" and "willfully. 222  The rules of statutory construction
require these two words to have different meanings so that neither is
superfluous.223 Moreover, knowingly engaging in behavior that vio-
lates the anti-kickback statute is not by itself sufficient to warrant
criminal liability, since the statute prohibits such a broad range of
conduct.2 4 Courts therefore should define "willfully" so as to identify
clearly the conduct as criminal. A "willful" act in violation of the
statute, in other words, should involve a criminal choice.
That criminal choice does not necessarily have to be the choice
to violate a specific law. Before the Ratzlaf decision, the lower courts
that dealt with ignorance-of-the-law defenses to structuring crimes
recognized this. For example, in United States v. Scanio,225 the
Second Circuit sustained the conviction of a defendant who had acted
with a "bad purpose" in structuring financial transactions, even
though the defendant claimed not to know that structuring was ille-
gal.226 The overwhelming majority of circuits also followed this ap-
proach.227
Such an approach is consistent with traditional understand-
ings of the word "willful." The word ordinarily has three basic conno-
tations: desire, voluntariness, and obstinacy. 228 In a more general
sense, "willfulness" implies placing oneself and one's own wishes
above the demands of society. It implies, in other words, that a per-
son acting willfully knows not only that she is doing something wrong,
but also that she desires it, sets out with a purpose to do it, and acts
not according to reason, but instead according to her own self-interest.
In a legal context, "willfully" may be defined as "proceeding from a
conscious motion of the will," "deliberate," "designed," "purposeful," or
in other ways that track the ordinary definition of the term. 229 All of
222. For the full text of the statute see note 9.
223. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140-41.
224. See Part III.A.
225. 900 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1990).
226. Id. at 491.
227. United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson,
983 F.2d 757, 767 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1389-92 (3d Cir. 1992),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 344-45 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gibbons, 968
F.2d 639, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (11th Cir.
1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 538-40 (10th Cir. 1991).
228. Webster's defines "willful" as "governed by will without yielding to reason or without
regard to reason: obstinately or perversely self-willed; ready or disposed to comply: willing;
done of one's own free will: not compulsory"
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2617 (Merriam-Webster, 1993).
229. Black's Law Dictionary at 1599 (cited in note 48).
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these definitions are very different from "knowingly," and yet none
goes so far as to require a specific intent to violate the law.
The word "willfully" in the anti-kickback statute should there-
fore be construed as requiring that a defendant have acted with a
fundamentally corrupt intent. This intent requirement, though per-
haps not overly precise, certainly renders the statute no more vague
and open-ended than the current version of the statute.2 30 Moreover,
unlike the Hanlester/Ratzlaf version of intent,231 this type of intent
would be possible to infer from the circumstances of a given case. For
example, under the facts in United States v. Porter,22 in which the
defendants received payments to send blood work to laboratories that
charged the government six times as much as other available
laboratories, a jury could easily reach the conclusion that the
defendants willfully acted with a corrupt purpose.
In fact, it already may be that some decisions turn largely on
generalized feelings about the level of corrupt intent a defendant has
displayed. For instance, in the Greber case,233 which provoked much
anxiety about the broad reach of the statute,2 34 there was a great deal
of evidence as to Dr. Greber's fundamentally corrupt intent.2 35 For
example, in his private practice alone, Dr. Greber ordered as many
Holter-monitors as the entire Hershey Medical Center.236 There was
thus significant evidence of overutilization.237 Additionally, at least
one physician had refused to sign the interpretation form, apparently
because he did not believe he was qualified to interpret the test.238
Most damningly, Dr. Greber had admitted in a prior civil proceeding
that "if the doctor didn't get his consulting fee, he wouldn't be using
our service. So the doctor got a consulting fee."239
The Greber court articulated a legal intent standard in holding
that requisite intent was present if one of the reasons a defendant
made payments to another provider was to induce future referrals.
An argument can be made, however, that the court's opinion was
230. For the full text of the statute, see note 9.
231. See Parts IV.A and IV.B.
232. 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979).
233. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985). See Part II.D.
234. See Part H.D.





239. Greber, 760 F.2d at 70.
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partly driven by a factual intent inquiry. This Note argues that such
an approach is legitimate and workable. Courts should look not
merely to whether defendants intend to provide remuneration to
induce future referrals, which encompasses a great deal of harmless
and even desirable conduct, nor to whether they intend to violate the
law. Rather, courts should refocus the intent issue as a straightfor-
ward mens rea or "guilty mind" standard. That is, courts should look
to whether a defendant acted with a corrupt intent.
Moreover, courts should construe the intent requirements that
Congress puts into statutes in ways that will further the goals of
these statutes within the bounds of due process, not in ways that will
eviscerate them entirely. Congress responded to the Ratzlaf decision
by simply taking the word "willfully" out of the statute.240 Thus, in
trying to address due process concerns, the Ratzlaf court succeeded in
encouraging Congress to significantly reduce the intent requirement.
With all the current attention to health care reform and to controlling
fraud and abuse, it is unlikely that Congress would be any more
willing to allow an ignorance of the law defense for the anti-kickback
statute than it was for the anti-structuring statute.
A heightened intent standard is a better approach. It is le-
gitimate because it fulfills Congress's goals in making remunerations
for referrals criminal conduct, but it does not unfairly penalize inno-
cent parties. It is workable because courts are institutionally capable
of inferring corrupt intent from the kinds of evidence that can be
offered in health care fraud cases, including insider testimony, expert
testimony, documents, and extrinsic act evidence. 241 It is therefore
consistent with both the goals of due process and the need to have an
effective statute to target criminal behavior in the health care indus-
try.
240. The current version of the statute: Whoever violates this section shall be fined in
accordance with Title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both."
31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(1). The House Conference Report stated:
[This provision] was adopted in order to correct the recent Supreme Court holding in
Ratzlaf v. United States.... This [provision] restores the clear Congressional intent
that a defendant need only have the intent to evade the reporting requirement as the
sufficient mens rea for the offense.
Riegle Community Development Act, H. Conf. Rep. No. 103-652, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 194
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 2024.





The anti-kickback statute walks a fine line between being
broad enough to encompass creative and unforeseen business ar-
rangements and being clear enough to give adequate notice of what
conduct will be considered criminal. The statute achieves the first
objective by broadly prohibiting all illegal remunerations, rather than
only those things that fall within the specific definitions of "bribe" or
"kickback." The statute attempts to achieve the second by containing
a "knowingly and willfully" requirement. "Knowingly" engaging in
conduct that is harmless, or even socially desirable, however, does not
establish a true mens rea for purposes of imposing criminal punish-
ment. The Hanlester court therefore properly looked to the word
"willfully" to supply an overt element of criminality. The court, how-
ever, unnecessarily construed this element of criminality as requiring
a specific intent to violate the statute. Criminality can instead be
established by acting in a corrupt manner, whether or not one knows
that a specific law or regulation exists which makes such action a
crime.
Tamsen Douglass Love
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